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IN DEFENSE OF RAYBURN HOUSE: WHY THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE AN
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE OF NONDISCLOSURE IN ITS SPEECH OR
DEBATE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Christopher M. Kieser*
Article I of the United States Constitution includes the legislative
privilege commonly known as the Speech or Debate Clause. The
Clause reads that members of Congress:
[S]hall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other Place.1

Despite the Clause’s long history,2 there have been comparatively
few Supreme Court cases dealing with the grant of legislative immunity for words spoken in legislative acts.3 Reasons for this could be
numerous, including the fact that legislators rarely commit acts worthy of prosecution in connection with their service in Congress. How 2012 Christopher M. Kieser. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2013; Bachelor of Arts,
History and Economics, University of Notre Dame, 2010. Special thanks to Professor
Richard W. Garnett for reading several drafts of this Note and offering his helpful
advice and to the editors and staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their editing
assistance. I would also like to thank my parents and my girlfriend, Sara Boocher, for
their love and support during the drafting of this Note.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
2 See infra Part I (discussing the history of the Clause).
3 At the time of writing, a Westlaw terms-and-connectors search for the term
“Speech or Debate Clause” revealed just forty-two Supreme Court cases which include
even a cursory glance at the Clause.
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ever, recent cases in both the Ninth4 and District of Columbia5
Circuits have created one of the first modern controversies over the
scope of the Clause. Specifically, the Circuits disagree over whether
the Clause provides an evidentiary privilege of non-disclosure during
an investigation into the activity of a member of Congress.6 If the
Supreme Court chooses to take this case, as some commentators
believe it will,7 it will have to address this disputed question and
decide once and for all how far the Speech or Debate Clause will
extend in protecting documents possibly used in a congressional
investigation.
This Note will argue that in order to preserve the structural values inherent in the Constitution, especially the separation of powers
and the independence of the legislative branch,8 the Supreme Court
should resolve this split in favor of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Rayburn House Office Building.9 This Note will demonstrate
that without the strong legislative privilege enunciated in that case,
the framers’ notion of legislative independence will be in danger.
The executive branch could take advantage of a weaker Speech or
Debate protection to give its agencies power to investigate documents
that come very close to the border of “legislative acts.” This flies in the
face of the structural ideal of separation of powers, but may prove to
be politically popular for a sitting president. To avoid such inevitable
conflicts of interest, the independent judiciary must strike the balance
between the other two branches. The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision
in Renzi fails to protect legislative independence, and despite
extremely valid concerns about the inability to control legislative corruption, it should be rebuked if and when the Supreme Court grants
certiorari on this issue.
Part I will begin by describing the origins and history of the
Speech or Debate Clause. Part II will provide an overview of the
Supreme Court’s modern Speech or Debate jurisprudence in order to
set the stage for the current split. Part III will follow with a detailed
4 United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
5 United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
6 See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032 (“Rather, to do as [Rep. Renzi] suggests would
require us to agree that there exists some grandiose, yet apparently shy, privilege of
non-disclosure that the Supreme Court has not thought fit to recognize.”)
7 See, e.g., Jonathon H. Adler, Circuit Split Over Speech and Debate Clause, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 24, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/24/
circuit-split-over-speech-and-debate-clause.
8 See, e.g., Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 839 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Ensuring
a strong and independent legislative branch was essential to the framers’ notion of
separation of powers . . . .”).
9 497 F.3d 654.
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analysis of the decisions leading up to Renzi in the Ninth Circuit and
Rayburn House in the D.C. Circuit. Part IV will analyze the holdings in
those cases and discuss the ensuing circuit split created after the
Ninth Circuit’s June 2011 decision in Renzi. Part V will conclude with
a recommendation that if the Supreme Court grants certiorari on the
issue, it should follow Rayburn House’s broader reading of the legislative immunity provision embodied in the Speech or Debate Clause in
order to protect the important constitutional values of legislative independence and separation of powers.
I. HISTORY

AND

BACKGROUND

OF THE

CLAUSE

Unlike other, more controversial grants of legislative power, the
Speech or Debate Clause was approved at the Federal Convention in
1787 without any debate or opposition.10 As the Supreme Court
stated in United States v. Johnson, the Clause adopted “almost verbatim
the language of Article V of the Articles of Confederation,” which “in
turn [is] almost identical to the English Bill of Rights of 1689.”11 The
English Bill of Rights provision states that “the freedom of speech,
and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached
or questioned in any court or place out of parliament.”12 As the
Supreme Court and some commentators have written, the original
Clause was a reaction to years of legislative suppression committed by
both the Tudor and Stuart monarchs in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.13 It was apparently intended to guarantee and preserve
“the independence and integrity of the legislature.”14 When the
Clause was adopted into the new United States Constitution, its purpose remained the same. Instead of regulating the dichotomy
between the monarch and the two houses of Parliament, its key goal
was to preserve the separation and autonomy of the new United States
Congress from encroachment by a hostile executive branch, made
worse by a possibly equally hostile judiciary.15 In contrast to previous
10 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966).
11 Id. at 177.
12 Modern History Sourcebook: The Bill of Rights, 1689, FORDHAM UNIV., http://www.
fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1689billofrights.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
13 See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178; John D. Pingel, Note, Do Congressmen Still Pay Parking Tickets? The D.C. Circuit’s Overextension of Legislative Privilege in United States v.
Rayburn House Office Building, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1625 (2009).
14 Pingel, supra note 13, at 1625.
15 See John D. Friel, Note, “Members Only!” United States v. Rayburn House Office
Building, Room 2113: The Speech or Debate Clause, the Separation of Powers and the Testimonial Privilege of Preemptive Nondisclosure, 53 VILL. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (“Thus,
what was substantively conceived as a protection from the judicial retribution of a
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Notes and Articles discussing the Rayburn House case,16 this Note
argues that the Clause must be interpreted broadly in order to serve
this original intent.
II. SUPREME COURT’S SPEECH

OR

DEBATE JURISPRUDENCE

A. Early Decisions: Speech or Debate in the Civil Context
The Supreme Court existed for nearly one hundred years before
it first had occasion to examine the meaning of the Speech or Debate
Clause. That first instance occurred in 1880 in Kilbourn v. Thompson.17
That case required the Court to determine whether the legislative
privilege embodied in the Clause protected sitting Congressmen in a
committee from an investigation into discussions on the floor of the
House of Representatives to determine whether they were guilty of
false imprisonment.18 In determining whether the committee’s written resolutions would be protected, the Court offered the first definitive statement on the extent of the legislative privilege:
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it
to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in
its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be
reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is done
vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation
to the business before it.19

In short, faced with a choice between narrowing the Clause to
enable a judicial investigation into the conduct of this legislative comhostile Executive is today recognized as an absolute procedural roadblock to otherwise legitimate judicial inquiry of any kind.”); Pingel, supra note 13, at 1625. (“[The
Clause] protects the legislature from potentially hostile executive or judiciary
branches.”);
16 See, e.g., Pingel, supra note 13, at 1623, 1642–47 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit
erred in its ruling in Rayburn House by creating “improper blanket immunity for members of Congress”); see also Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate Clause: Bastion of
Congressional Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 197, 198 (1979)
(arguing that long before the idea that the Speech or Debate Clause contained an
evidentiary privilege had surfaced, the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the
clause “created a serious impediment to the successful investigation and prosecution
of congressional corruption”).
17 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
18 The plaintiff claimed that he was placed in a District of Columbia jail for fortyfive days after the defendants forcibly removed him from his house. Id. at 170; see also
id. at 170–78 (describing the plea that the actions were protected by the Clause as well
as the proceedings in the House that led to the suit).
19 Id. at 204.
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mittee (which could have seemed like the more palatable alternative,
especially given the accusation), and holding to the principles and
protecting legislative independence with a strong privilege, the Court
opted for the latter. By holding that the written acts of this particular
legislative committee were protected by the Clause from investigation
(and, in effect, the defendants were immune from being held liable
for the intentional tort of false imprisonment),20 the Supreme Court
established precedent for a strong legislative privilege.21 Kilbourn’s
facts could have been reason enough for the Court to shy away from
the privilege and weaken it, but instead Kilbourn gave us a strong interpretation of the privilege and an important jumping off point for
more modern Speech or Debate jurisprudence.
The Clause was addressed on only a few occasions in the Supreme
Court between Kilbourn and the beginning of the modern era. The
next significant case expanding on the Court’s jurisprudence came in
1951, at a time when McCarthyism was exerting significant pressure
on the freedom of speech and expression in the United States.22 Tenney v. Brandhove23 involved plaintiff William Brandhove challenging
the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities and
20 However, the Court noted that the House, of course, retains the jurisdiction to
punish its own members for transgressions where the judiciary cannot. Id. at 189.
Kilbourn even countenanced a possible penalty of imprisonment for certain wrongdoings. Id. at 189–90.
21 Some commentators, including Professor Bradley, have argued that the Court
created this broad privilege almost out of thin air, purportedly relying on the seminal
Massachusetts case of Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 1 (1808), but actually ignoring
an important aspect of that case, namely that the privileged acts or materials must
have occurred or been produced within the legitimate duties of the legislator. See,
e.g., Bradley, supra note 16, at 216 (“The Kilbourn Court failed to note, however, that,
having thus paid lip service to a broad legislative privilege, the Coffin court went on to
conclude that Micajah Coffin was not ‘executing the duties of his office.’ ” (quoting
Coffin, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) at 30)). This principle would surface in the Supreme Court’s
later jurisprudence as the requirement that privileged material be created in the
course of a legislative act. See infra Part II.C. It was not ignored in Kilbourn because,
as Professor Bradley seems to acknowledge, the acts there (committee memos and
resolutions) were clearly within the duties of the office. See Bradley, supra note 16, at
217.
22 See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 49 (2006)
(describing some actions of the House Un-American Activities Committee and quoting then-Chief Justice Earl Warren in blaming the government for its large role in
abridging the freedom of speech and expression); Jonathan S. Masur, Probability
Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1342 (2007) (describing “the period of McCarthyism
during the 1940s and 1950s” as “an era characterized by what are now viewed as excessive assaults on the freedom of speech”).
23 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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California state Senator Jack B. Tenney. Brandhove claimed that Tenney and his Committee violated his civil rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and by statute.24 After the Ninth Circuit sided with
Brandhove and held that he could state a valid claim for relief,25 the
Supreme Court found that the legislative privilege applied and
accordingly reversed. The Court gave a powerful endorsement to a
strong legislative privilege in Tenney. After discussing the historical
background of the Clause and its formulations in several of the
Revolution-era state constitutions,26 Justice Frankfurter added a new
justification for the breadth of the Clause, even surpassing the language used in Kilbourn. That powerful addition was the broad support
of the privilege even in the face of heavy skepticism of legislatures on
the part of both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.27 In Frankfurter’s view, because influential framers who were not enamored by
the possibility of legislative overreach still saw fit to give that branch of
government such complete protection from liability, the privilege
could not be overcome by a simple act of that same legislature. Part
of Brandhove’s complaint was based on a statute passed by Congress
in 1871 under the enforcement power of Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Justice Frankfurter rightfully expressed his surprise and doubt that the Congress itself meant, in the course of
passing the statute, to abrogate the legislative privilege. As he wrote,
“[w]e cannot believe that Congress—itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in
history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before
24 See id. at 369.
25 See Brandhove v. Tenney, 183 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1950). The Ninth Circuit’s
short opinion failed to even mention the legislative privilege in determining that
Brandhove’s suit could proceed.
26 See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373–74.
27 Id. at 375. Justice Frankfurter noted that legislatures were the supreme power
in every state during and immediately after the Revolution, and quoted Madison’s
declaration that “[t]he legislative department is every where extending the sphere of
its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison)).
28 Id. at 369. The statute provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946).
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us.”29 The Court then inquired into whether the activities of the Committee were “within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” and
determined that “[i]nvestigations . . . are an established part of representative government,” and therefore the Committee was performing
a legitimate function and could not be questioned or held liable for
acts occurring as a result of it.30
Justice Black, concurring in Tenney, generally endorsed Justice
Frankfurter’s expansive reading of the Clause and agreed that the
Committee could not be held liable for its actions in requiring
Brandhove to testify, but he cautioned that “there is a point at which a
legislator’s conduct so far exceeds the bounds of legislative power that
he may be held personally liable in a suit brought under the Civil
Rights Act.”31 However, neither Justice Black nor Justice Frankfurter
gave any indication of what such a point might be, or how close Tenney’s Committee had come to liability despite the enunciation of a
strong privilege. Justice Black did strongly criticize Tenney’s
actions,32 but, known as a staunch textualist and originalist, he agreed
with Frankfurter’s analysis of the broad privilege in order to protect
the independence of the legislature.33
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Tenney, presented an argument for
a far weaker legislative privilege. He was extremely worried that the
Speech or Debate shield could become essentially an unlimited grant
of immunity and eventually apply to far more conduct than he
believed was socially optimal.34 He did not trust the internal governance of legislatures nor the political process to correct issues such as
the stifling of free speech that took place as a result of the Committee

29 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
30 Id. at 376–78.
31 Id. at 379 (Black, J., concurring).
32 Among other things, Justice Black clarified his view of the matter: “[t]hat is to
say, the holding that the chairman and the other members of his Committee cannot
be sued in this case is not a holding that their alleged persecution of Brandhove is
legal conduct.” Id. He also worried about the effect that such a strong privilege
could have on freedom of speech and the press generally if committees are simply
allowed to call anyone to be investigated and have their actions protected by the Constitution. Id. at 380–81. This, of course, is a valid concern. However, in our system of
government, the political process is designed to solve problems like this, and the privilege should not be circumvented even if the ends seem noble enough. Like the Court
in Kilbourn imagined, the legislature retains the power to punish its own members.
See supra note 20.
33 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379 (Black, J., concurring).
34 See id. at 381–83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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in Tenney and others like it throughout the nation at the time.35 Justice Douglas’s description, through a series of rhetorical questions, of
the results that could stem from the Court’s holding, was striking:
But we are apparently holding today that the actions of those committees have no limits in the eyes of the law. May they depart with
impunity from their legislative functions, sit as kangaroo courts, and
try men for their loyalty and their political beliefs? May they substitute trial before committees for trial before juries? May they sit as a
board of censors over industry, prepare their blacklists of citizens,
and issue pronouncements as devastating as any bill of attainder?36

Justice Douglas essentially argued that the Court’s “extension” of
the Clause came at the expense of the First Amendment rights of the
public. His opinion was clearly in the minority at this point, as seven
members of the Court joined in Frankfurter’s strong endorsement of
the legislative privilege. The end result was that, in 1951 (though with
an admittedly small sample size), the Court uniformly praised the
Speech or Debate Clause and the idea of legislative privilege in general. There were no limits enumerated other than the legitimate legislative acts requirement, and the Court had given no indication of
how far afield such “Un-American Activity Committees” would have to
extend in order for the legislators at fault to lose their immunity. It
was against this backdrop that the Court heard its first criminal case
presenting a legislative privilege question.
B. The Court Interprets the Clause in the Criminal Context
After deciding only two Speech or Debate cases in the first one
and a half centuries of the Court’s existence, the first criminal matter
involving the privilege finally arrived in 1966 in the case of United
States v. Johnson.37 There, a former United States Congressman was
indicted on accusations that he both violated the federal conflict of
interest statute38 and participated in a conspiracy to defraud the
United States.39 The Fourth Circuit overturned his conspiracy convic35 For example, McCarthyism was rampant in the United States at the time of the
Tenney decision. Wide support existed for limiting the free speech rights of those
suspected to be communist sympathizers. See generally Internal Security Act of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (providing restrictions on the activities of several
groups, including communists, and passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses
over President Truman’s veto).
36 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 382 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37 383 U.S. 169 (1966); see Bradley, supra note 16, at 218 (confirming that this was
in fact the first criminal case involving the legislative privilege).
38 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1964); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 170.
39 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 170–71.
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tion40 on the ground that he could not be questioned about conspiring to make a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives
without violating the Speech or Debate Clause.41 It also vacated his
other convictions not directly related to the alleged speech because
“the invalidity of [the conspiracy charge] as applied to Johnson was
obviously prejudicial to his right to the unbiased consideration of the
jury on the remaining counts. Many of the events testified to at the
trial related only to the speech.”42
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit in both
respects.43 All seven Justices who considered the case agreed that the
conspiracy charge had to be thrown out because the act of questioning former Representative Johnson about the speech would be a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause.44 The majority, led by Justice
Harlan, clearly applied the strong privilege from Kilbourn and Tenney
in the criminal context. In fact, Justice Harlan indicated that he
intended to follow the broad reading encouraged by those cases.45
He acknowledged that neither of those cases dealt with a criminal
investigation against a then-sitting Representative, but connected this
case to that line by asserting that “it is apparent from the history of the
clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid
private suits such as those in Kilbourn and Tenney, but rather to prevent intimidation by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”46 Having confirmed that the “prophylactic
purposes” of the Clause47 applied just as strongly to criminal as civil
cases, the majority moved on to address whether the Clause protects
legislators’ purposes and motivations as much as actual legislative acts
themselves. The question of how far the privilege extends in protecting things that may not themselves be direct legislative acts, but would
require the executive to conduct a search of a Representative’s personal files, containing privileged information, to prove a violation of
40 See United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180, 192 (4th Cir. 1964)
41 See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 171.
42 Johnson, 337 F.2d at 204.
43 Neither Justice Black nor Justice White took part in the decision. The vote was
therefore 4–3, with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan concurring in the portion of the opinion that overturned the conspiracy charges but asserting that the Court should have decided the federal conflict counts rather than leave
them to remand. See Johnson, 338 U.S. at 186–87 (Warren, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 180 (majority opinion) (“Kilbourn and Tenney indicate that the legislative
privilege will be read broadly to effectuate its purposes . . . .”).
46 Id. at 180–81.
47 Id. at 182.
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law, is a difficult one to answer. This Note argues that these “peripheral” documents should be privileged, despite the possible societal
costs, to preserve the independence of the legislature and the original
meaning of the Speech or Debate Clause.
On the question of purpose, Justice Harlan turned to both Tenney
and the landmark case of Fletcher v. Peck48 for the proposition that the
federal courts are not the proper vehicle to investigate the purpose of
individual legislators, and that it is actually a violation of the ideas of
separation of powers and an independent legislature for courts to
investigate such.49 The opinion quoted Tenney with approval for the
proposition that “[t]he claim of an unworthy purpose does not
destroy the privilege.”50 This, along with the Court’s discussion of the
English case Ex parte Wason,51 which involved a conspiracy between
several members of Parliament to make untrue statements in the
House of Lords,52 formed the basis for the Court’s assertion that the
privilege applied. Professor Bradley has argued that it was inaccurate
to reference Wason because in Britain it would not have been a crime
to utter such statements, or to conspire to do so; instead, it would have
simply been a breach of the privilege and Parliament would have had
the exclusive power to discipline its own members.53 However, true as
this may be, it does not change the fact that such actions would be
privileged in the United States as well, so that even if they would normally be considered a crime if committed outside the House walls,
representatives are protected from such prosecution if it is based on
legitimate legislative acts. In addition, the Court’s main reason for
citing and discussing Wason in the first place appears to be to
strengthen its holding that the judiciary may not inquire into the individual purpose of legislators.54 Professor Bradley’s distinction therefore seems inapposite. Though he concedes that “Johnson may have
reached the correct result because the Court was dealing with a broad
statute that was not by its terms applicable to congressmen,” he maintains that Johnson’s language stretched the scope of the Clause to capture actions that are not legitimately within the sphere of the
legislature.55 This Note argues that the prophylactic function of the
48 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
49 See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 (citing Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 130).
50 Id. (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)).
51 See id. at 183.
52 See Bradley, supra note 16, at 219 (describing, in his opinion, the Johnson
Court’s misplaced reliance on Wason).
53 See id.
54 See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 183.
55 Bradley, supra note 16, at 220.
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Clause requires it to occasionally bring into its purview some materials
outside of the legislative sphere in order to adequately protect individual legislators’ freedom to engage in legislative acts without fear of
prosecution.
C. The Legislative Act Restriction “Narrows” The Privilege
It is commonly thought that, while Johnson represented a broad,
generous reading of the Speech or Debate clause (unwarranted,
according to some),56 the next leading legislative privilege case,
United States v. Brewster,57 was responsible for weakening the protection the Clause gave to congressmen.58 This conclusion is not quite
correct. Brewster involved the prosecution of a former United States
Senator for allegedly accepting a bribe to cast a vote in a certain way.59
Of course, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, Brewster moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that the Speech
or Debate Clause prohibited a court from inquiring into his motives.60
The District Court, in a short opinion quoted by Chief Justice Burger,
attempted to follow Johnson and ruled that prosecution of Senator
Brewster was in fact barred by the Clause.61 This illustrated the confusion that the “purpose” language from Johnson caused in the interpretation of the privilege, as the Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the
District Court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanding for a new
trial.62
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, as Professor Bradley points out,
created a contradiction in the Court’s Speech or Debate jurisprudence.63 Johnson had held that the legislative privilege prevented judicial inquiry into an individual legislator’s motive or purpose for acting
a certain way in performing his legislative duties, but Brewster allowed
56 See supra notes 52–53 and 55.
57 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
58 See, e.g., Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of
Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 405 (1994) (“If Johnson offered a
generous reading of the Clause, Brewster tightened considerably the range of constitutional protection against prosecution for criminal offenses.”).
59 See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 502–03 (describing the indictment against Senator
Brewster).
60 Id. at 503.
61 The District Court’s opinion, as quoted by the Supreme Court, stated: “It is the
opinion of this Court that the immunity under the Speech and [sic] Debate Clause of
the Constitution, particularly in view of the interpretation given that Clause by the
Supreme Court in Johnson, shields Senator Brewster, constitutionally shields him
from any prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a legislative act.” Id. at 504.
62 Id. at 528–29.
63 See Bradley, supra note 16, at 221 (“A contradiction is immediately apparent.”).
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an inquiry into a bribe to sustain the Government’s prima facie case.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, even the Government’s
attorneys did not claim that Brewster’s acts were not within the legislative sphere.64 He then succinctly stated the flaw of the majority’s argument, namely that, under Johnson, these were not legislative acts:
These charges, it seemed to me, fell within the clear prohibition of
the Speech or Debate Clause as interpreted by decisions of this
Court, particularly United States v. Johnson. For if the indictment did
not call into question the “speeches or debates” of the Senator, it
certainly laid open to scrutiny the motives for his legislative acts;
and those motives, I had supposed, were no more subject to executive
and judicial inquiry than the acts themselves, unless, of course, the Congress could delegate such inquiry to the other branches.65

Justice Brennan felt that the only issue was whether Congress,
through a statute, could effectively delegate the power to discipline an
individual member of the legislature for receiving a bribe.66 He concluded that even such a “narrowly drawn statute”67 would not apply
because Congress itself could not abrogate a portion of the Constitution, even if it was for the purpose of allowing a member of another
branch to discipline a legislator for reprehensible conduct.68
64 See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan quoted heavily
from the trial court proceedings:
At the hearing before the District Court, the prosecutor was asked point
blank whether “the indictment in any wise [sic] allege[d] that Brewster did
anything not related to his purely legislative functions.” The prosecutor
responded: “We are not contending that what is being charged here, that is,
the activity by Brewster, was anything other than a legislative act. We are not
ducking the question; it is squarely presented. They are legislative acts.”
Id.
65 Id. at 529–30 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
66 Id. at 531.
67 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966)
68 See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 540–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Government
offers several reasons why such a ‘waiver’ of legislative immunity should be allowed.
None of these, it seems to me, is sufficient to override the public’s interest in legislative independence, secured to it by the principles of the Speech or Debate Clause.”);
see also Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation
of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1169–70 (1973) (“For similar reasons, Congress
should not be able to divest any of its members of the privilege by a statute authorizing prosecution in the courts. As we have indicated, the privilege is guaranteed to
each member personally, and its constitutional protection is not subject to collective
discretion.”). But see Bradley, supra note 16, at 223–24. Bradley argues that the framers did not intend to prevent Congress from passing such a statute on the grounds
that this was not how the British Parliament would have interpreted their provision.
He argues that instead the privilege was the property of the legislature as a whole, and
such “narrowly tailored” statutes should be permitted to abrogate the privilege.
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The majority did not address that contention. It also did not
overrule Johnson, preferring to make the distinction between apparently “legitimate” legislative acts “necessary to preserve the integrity of
the legislative process,”69 and those which fell completely outside the
sphere of legislation. This distinction fails to provide adequate protection to the independence of the legislature, as Justice Brennan
pointed out.70 The Brewster situation is remarkably similar to the
dilemma faced by the two Courts of Appeal in the cases this Note will
discuss below, Rayburn House and Renzi.71 While Brewster purports to
follow Johnson, the reality is that Brewster has allowed lower courts to
exempt far more conduct from the protection of the privilege72 and
has played a hand in creating the circuit split that this Note will
address.
D. Gravel Further Erodes Johnson
In the same year as the Court decided Brewster, it also handed
down a decision in another Speech or Debate Clause case, Gravel v.
United States.73 In Gravel, a United States Senator’s staff members were
subpoenaed to testify as part of a federal grand jury investigation into
the publication of the classified “Pentagon Papers.”74 The Senator
moved to quash the subpoenas on the ground that “requiring these
witnesses to appear and testify would violate his privilege under the
Speech or Debate Clause . . . .”75 The District Court denied the
motion,76 and the First Circuit affirmed.77 The Supreme Court followed suit, though not before emphasizing that it was not attempting
to weaken the privilege itself, rather only to limit the scope of legislative activities. First, Justice White confirmed that anything Senator
Gravel said at the subcommittee hearing from which the publication
of the Pentagon Papers resulted was automatically privileged under
69 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 517 (majority opinion).
70 See supra note 68.
71 See infra Parts III–IV.
72 See, e.g., United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1161–62, 1163–64 (E.D.
Pa. 1993). The Court stated, “The taking of a bribe by a member of Congress is . . .
not protected,” and held that the Clause was not violated in a proceeding charging
Congressman McDade with “accepting illegal gratuities, conspiracy, and racketeering.” Id. at 1163 (citing Brewster, 408 U.S. at 501).
73 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
74 See id. at 608.
75 Id. at 609.
76 See United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 938 (D. Mass. 1971).
77 See United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 763 (1st Cir. 1972).
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the Clause.78 The Court also emphatically rejected the Government’s
argument that Senator Gravel’s aides and staff were not entitled to the
privilege because the Clause only referred to “Senators and
Representatives.”79
However, the Court agreed with the lower courts that the republication of the Pentagon Papers was not protected by the Clause.80
Again reading Johnson narrowly, the Court stated that “[l]egislative
acts are not all-encompassing,”81 and agreed with the proposition that
not everything done by a congressman or senator having any relation
to his or her duties is covered by the privilege.82 This is where the
majority and dissents differed sharply. Justice Douglas (who had
interestingly been a dissenter in Tenney, where he had presented an
argument for a weaker privilege in the civil context)83 argued that
Johnson counseled a generous reading of the privilege, and that “[i]f
republication of a Senator’s speech in a newspaper carries the privilege, as it doubtless does, then republication of the exhibits introduced at a hearing before Congress must also do so.”84 He did not
believe that it was the province of the federal courts to inquire into
the reason for the publication, but thought that the republication was
“clearly” covered by the Speech or Debate Clause.85
Justice Brennan, also dissenting, emphatically recast his views
from Brewster and accused the majority of misreading the history of
the legislative privilege in the United States to arrive at its result.86
78 See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 615–16.
79 See id. at 616–19 (“We have little doubt that we are neither exceeding our
judicial powers nor mistakenly construing the Constitution by holding that the
Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as
the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the
Member himself.”).
80 See id. at 622–23 (citing Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1156 (Q.B.
1839)).
81 Id. at 625.
82 See id.
83 See supra text accompanying notes 34–36.
84 Gravel, 408 U.S. at 636–37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 634–35, 639–40 (“Classification of documents is a concern of the Congress. It is, however, no concern of the courts, as I see it, how a document is stamped
in an Executive Department or whether a committee of Congress can obtain the use
of it.”).
86 See id. at 652–59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the views of key founders
and framers, including Jefferson and James Wilson, that the freedom of speech from
a legislator to his constituents should be unencumbered by the other branches
because it is one of the most important ways to protect the freedom of the people,
and arguing that the English precedents were wrongly interpreted by the Court and
actually support Senator Gravel’s position).
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Expanding on his views of the possible negative effects from Brewster,
he wrote:
The threat of “prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary,” that the Clause was designed to avoid,
can only lead to timidity in the performance of this vital function.
The Nation as a whole benefits from the congressional investigation
and exposure of official corruption and deceit. It likewise suffers
when that exposure is replaced by muted criticism, carefully hushed
behind congressional walls.87

Justice Brennan’s broad reading once again best represents both
the original intent of the Clause and privilege as well as the Court’s
precedent in Kilbourn, Tenney, and Johnson. The Court should, and
may, head back in this direction if it gets the opportunity to review the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Renzi in an upcoming term. Both Brewster
and Gravel had strong and multiple dissents, which may be an indication that a small change in the composition of the Court could create
a monumental change in doctrine. This Note argues that Justice
Brennan’s approach, if applied to the set of facts from Renzi, would
yield a stronger and more effective privilege able to protect the values
of an independent legislature and separate, co-equal branches of government. From here, our discussion moves on to the circuit split in
question.
III. A CIRCUIT SPLIT EMERGES OVER THE EXISTENCE
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE OF NON-DISCLOSURE

OF AN

A. The Road to Rayburn House in the D.C. Circuit:
Brown & Williamson
Twelve years prior to the much-maligned Rayburn House decision,
the D.C. Circuit faced a Speech or Debate question in a civil case. In
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,88 the Court of Appeals
was asked to decide whether two Congressmen, Representatives Waxman (the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce) and
Wyman, could be forced to comply with a subpoena duces tecum.89
The tort action arose when Williams, an employee of the law firm representing the tobacco company Brown & Williamson, stole documents
belonging to the company.90 Some documents apparently made their
87 Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1968)).
88 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
89 Id. at 412.
90 See id. at 411.
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way into the hands of the Subcommittee chaired by Representative
Waxman. As a result, both Representatives were asked to turn over
the documents after the Subcommittee began an investigation on the
effects of tobacco products.91
After the District Court ruled that the legislative privilege barred
the enforcement of subpoenas against Waxman and Wyman, Brown &
Williamson appealed.92 The D.C. Circuit broke from several established precedents in other circuits in order to establish its core holding that the Speech or Debate Clause includes a privilege of nondisclosure.93 This was a very broad reading of the Clause, but one
which adequately safeguarded the independence of the legislature by
implying the existence of a method of enforcement. Disagreeing with
the Third Circuit, the D.C. Circuit explained that:
We do not share the Third Circuit’s conviction that democracy’s
“limited toleration for secrecy” is inconsistent with an interpretation
of the Speech or Debate Clause that would permit Congress to insist
on the confidentiality of investigative files. To the extent that the
Third Circuit has adopted a special rule for the testimonial use of
documents, we therefore disagree.94

The effect of the D.C. Circuit’s failure to draw a distinction
between use and disclosure for the purpose of the legislative privilege
was to effectively create a privilege of non-disclosure for documents
pertaining to legislative acts. As one commentator summed up,
“[b]ecause the Clause protects against any disruption of the legislative
process, the legislative privilege also protects against forced disclosure
of written legislative materials.”95 Thus, the D.C. Circuit was in possession of clear precedent on which to base its decision in Rayburn House.

91 See id. at 412.
92 Id.
93 The Court of Appeals mentioned in detail the Third Circuit case In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978), which held that because the Speech or
Debate Clause was not designed to encourage secrecy, it could not include a privilege
of non-disclosure along with the non-evidentiary use privilege. Brown & Williamson,
62 F.3d at 420 (discussing In re Grand Jury Investigation 587 F.2d at 595, 597).
94 Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420. The court also noted that the Supreme
Court had never addressed any difference between the production of documents and
forced testimony under the legislative privilege, so they were unwilling to read one
into the existing jurisprudence. Id.
95 Pingel, supra note 13, at 1634.
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B. United States v. Rayburn House Office Building
We now come to this much-maligned 2007 decision of the D.C.
Circuit.96 The case presented a novel issue not directly confronted in
the Brown & Williamson decision: whether, when a search of a congressman’s office inevitably turns up both privileged and non-privileged documents, the congressman is entitled to the return of all
materials under the Brown & Williamson evidentiary non-disclosure
privilege, or, in the alternative, only those materials that are determined to be privileged.97
1. Facts
In Rayburn House, investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) searched Congressman William J. Jefferson’s office pursuant to a warrant obtained by the Department of Justice (DOJ).98 An
informant had come forward and accused the Congressman of
accepting a bribe, bribing a foreign official, and wire fraud, as well as
conspiracy to commit those offenses.99 The DOJ, an arm of the executive branch, determined that the only reasonable way to obtain possible records of the illegal transactions was to execute a search of
Representative Jefferson’s office.100 The DOJ and FBI were sensitive
to the Speech or Debate Clause during the search.101 They devised a
system designed to separate privileged from nonprivileged materials
96 Given that Professor Bradley and others had been writing even after decisions
like Brewster and Gravel, (see Bradley, supra note 16) that the privilege had gone too
far, it is not surprising that a few Notes popped up criticizing Rayburn House in recent
years. See, e.g., Friel, supra note 15 (arguing that, although Rayburn House was correctly decided, it lacked enforceable limits and had other problems which would
cause difficulty in lower court application); Pingel, supra note 13 (arguing that Rayburn House took even the Brown & Williamson rule too far by applying it to some
unprivileged material that was intermingled with privileged documents, and that the
framers did not intend for the immunity to stretch this far).
97 See Rayburn House v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654,
655 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Judge Henderson, concurring in the judgment, stated the issue
as “can Executive Branch personnel—here, special agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation—execute a search warrant directed to the congressional office of a
Member of the Congress (Member) without doing violence to the Speech or Debate
Clause . . . ?” Id. at 666 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment); see also Pingel, supra
note 13, at 1639 (“The novel issue in Rayburn deals with the interplay of nonprivileged material intermixed with privileged legislative material.”).
98 Rayburn House, 497 F.3d at 656.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.

R
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and protect politically charged documents as much as possible.102
Despite its efforts, the contents of the search arguably went beyond
what the DOJ expected to collect. Nevertheless, the DOJ placed an
immediate freeze on the collected materials before the members of
the executive could sort through them.103
Immediately after the search was executed, Congressman Jefferson challenged its constitutionality under the Speech or Debate
Clause. He claimed that he held a right to determine for himself
which documents fell under the legislative privilege’s protection and
which were nonprivileged.104 After the District Court found that the
Congressman had no right to remove materials that he determined
were privileged,105 he was granted a stay of the search pending appeal
to the D.C. Circuit.106 The D.C. Circuit, as described below, correctly
dealt a strong blow for a broad legislative privilege despite the serious
allegations levied against Congressman Jefferson.
2. Analysis and Opinion
The D.C. Circuit’s main argument was that the precedent it set in
Brown & Williamson properly decided that the Clause, in order to
102 The Court of Appeals described the DOJ’s procedures for filtering the materials as follows:
The filter team would determine: (1) whether any of the seized documents
were not responsive to the search warrant, and return any such documents
to the Congressman; and (2) whether any of the seized documents were
subject to the Speech or Debate Clause privilege or other privilege. Materials determined to be privileged or not responsive would be returned without
dissemination to the prosecution team. Materials determined by the filter
team not to be privileged would be turned over to the prosecution team,
with copies to the Congressman’s attorney within ten business days of the
search. Materials determined by the filter team to be potentially privileged
would, absent the Congressman’s consent to Executive use of a potentially
privileged document, be submitted to the district court for review, with a log
and copy of such documents provided to the Congressman’s attorney within
20 business days of the search. The filter team would make similar determinations with respect to the data on the copied computer hard drives, following an initial electronic screening by the FBI’s Computer Analysis and
Response Team.
Id. at 656–57.
103 Id. at 657.
104 See id.
105 See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room No. 2113, 432 F.
Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006).
106 See Rayburn House, 497 F.3d at 658. The District Court had found that “[t]he
fact that some privileged material was incidentally captured by the search does not
constitute an unlawful intrusion.” Rayburn House, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 114.
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serve its proper function, must contain a privilege of evidentiary nondisclosure.107 Rayburn House extended Brown & Williamson to criminal proceedings, which is fairly uncontroversial and was not disputed
by the Ninth Circuit in Renzi.108 This Note argues that the ultimate
holding of Rayburn House, which granted to Congressman Jefferson
the return of all privileged documents but not those which were not
privileged,109 was correct and that the evidentiary privilege of nondisclosure should have been applied in Renzi. To do this, this Note
will respond to the three contentions in John D. Pingel’s recent Note
in the University of California Davis Law Review, which generally argues
that the D.C. Circuit erred in Rayburn House by including a privilege of
evidentiary non-disclosure in the Speech or Debate Clause.110
First, Pingel argued that Rayburn House runs counter to the
Supreme Court cases that limited the scope of the privilege by condensing the definition of a legislative act, most notably Brewster and
Gravel.111 Whether this assertion is true (and it probably is, because
Rayburn House does have the net effect of strengthening the privilege
while Brewster and Gravel clearly weakened it) is irrelevant to the question of whether Rayburn House was correctly decided.112 Rayburn
107 See Rayburn House, 497 F.3d at 660 (arguing that Brown & Williamson’s nondisclosure privilege was required in order to protect the freedom and independence
of the legislature from bothersome civil suits as well as criminal prosecution, and
rehashing that case’s assertions that the seizure of documents is just as intrusive to a
legislator as if he were forced to testify in front of a grand jury).
108 See id. (“Although Brown & Williamson involved civil litigation and the documents being sought were legislative in nature, the court’s discussion of the Speech or
Debate Clause was more profound and repeatedly referred to the functioning of the
Clause in criminal proceedings.”). But see id. at 666–67 (Henderson, J., concurring in
judgment) (“But Brown & Williamson’s brief comments regarding the Clause in the
criminal context—which comments importantly acknowledge the Clause’s less categorical scope in that context—remain dicta no matter how ‘profound.’ ” (quoting id.
at 661 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted))).
109 See id. at 665–66 (majority opinion).
110 See generally Pingel, supra note 13. The title of his Note, a rhetorical question
“Do Congressmen Pay Parking Tickets?,” adequately sums up Pingel’s view of the privilege of non-disclosure.
111 See id. at 1639–42 (arguing that the Supreme Court had retreated from a
broader reading of the legislative privilege with its holdings in Gravel and Brewster and
that the D.C. Circuit erred in Rayburn House by contravening the Court’s clear direction with respect to the Speech or Debate Clause).
112 In any event, as noted throughout the discussion of the applicable Supreme
Court precedent, Justice Brennan’s interpretation of the Clause in both Brewster and
Gravel is more faithful to both original intent of the framers and Justice Harlan’s
opinion in Johnson. See supra Part II. If Brewster and Gravel had been decided according to Justice Brennan’s rationale, the decision in Rayburn House would not be
controversial.
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House, as Pingel concedes, involved a search that inevitably uncovered
some materials that were protected by the privilege and others that
were not.113 The ultimate holding imposes only the sensible requirement from Brown & Williamson that documents, the discovery of
which can be just as intrusive as forced testimony, receive the same
protection from the Clause as such testimony would.114 It does not
disturb the trend established in Brewster and Gravel of narrowing the
scope of legitimate legislative acts. Only privileged materials, that is,
those that fall within the definition of “legislative acts,” were required
to be returned to Congressman Jefferson. The assertion by the D.C.
Circuit that “a search that allows agents of the Executive to review
privileged materials without the Member’s consent violates the
Clause”115 is necessary lest the executive be able to circumvent the
privilege by simply claiming that the material is unprivileged. Given
that the Clause has been interpreted to have “prophylactic purposes,”116 these would be best served by capturing some unprivileged
material along with the privileged documents rather than sacrificing
some materials protected by the privilege in order to allow the executive to continue more favorably with the investigation. While the
investigation may serve an important public good, this should not win
out over first principles such as the independence of the legislature
and the protection of three co-equal branches of government. This is
especially true because legislative mechanisms exist to punish corruption117 that are not offensive to the Constitution and still protect the
right of the people to fair, uncorrupted representation in both houses
of Congress. In addition, the privilege should not be defeated simply
because it suppresses relevant evidence; this is the traditional function
of privileges.118
Why place structural and procedural values above a legitimate
concern about corruption in the legislative branch? The framers pro113 See Pingel, supra note 13, at 1641.
114 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 420–21 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
115 Rayburn House v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, 497 F.3d 654, 663
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
116 See supra text accompanying note 47.
117 See supra note 21.
118 See, e.g., Mikah K. Story Thompson, To Speak or Not to Speak? Navigating the
Treacherous Waters of Parallel Investigations Following the Amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 939, 981 (2008) (“Traditionally, the evidentiary privileges
. . . have been the vehicle by which courts exclude relevant, reliable evidence for
extrinsic policy reasons.”). Here, the policy reasons are those discussed throughout
this Note, namely protecting the ancient values of separation of powers and an independent, unimpeded legislature.
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vided us with little reason to trust one branch with a high degree of
power to regulate the internal affairs of one of the other branches.
Rather, the Constitution is filled with provisions that caution against
accumulating too much power in one branch.119 Legislative independence is not only supported by the precedents cited in this Note, but
also by the Vesting Clause of Article I, granting the legislative power to
Congress.120 Though it may be argued that these principles actually
authorize executive interference into the affairs of Congress, this is
not the case. Concentrated power in the hands of the executive is
more dangerous than concentration of power in the other branches,
because the fact that the power is concentrated at the top of the
branch makes it easier to exercise executive power than legislative
power. Because of this, executive interference in legislative affairs,
even at the margins of where the Speech or Debate Clause applies, has
the potential to allow the executive to gain undue control over legislative actions. Corruption is not exclusive to members of Congress; officials in the executive branch have the potential to abuse their power
just as much, if not more so, than legislators. Legislative independence is not simply an arcane notion that serves no purpose in today’s
monolithic federal government. It provides security against the
branches overstepping their bounds and allows the legislators themselves to resolve disputes within the branch.
Next, Pingel argued that Rayburn House runs counter to the
intent of the framers by creating “blanket immunity” for congressmen
who commit crimes.121 This argument does not hold up because, as
this Note has demonstrated, there is no blanket immunity. Congressmen may in fact be prosecuted as long as independent evidence
exists. For example, the case against Representative Jefferson continued after the D.C. Circuit decided that materials privileged under the
Speech or Debate Clause must be returned to the Congressman.122
The District Court in United States v. Jefferson denied Representative
Jefferson’s request to suppress all of the evidence from the search,
119 For example, the presidential veto prevents the two houses of Congress from
accumulating power through legislation, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 7, and the Appointments Clause provides restrictions on the president’s power to populate the executive
branch with those unduly loyal to him. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The structural qualities of the Constitution make it clear that the framers were highly skeptical of any
concentration of power. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
120 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”).
121 See Pingel, supra note 13, at 1642–45.
122 See United States v. Jefferson, 615 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (E.D. Va. 2009).
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and therefore allowed the case to go forward on the basis of the nonprivileged evidence.123 Though it cannot be disputed that extra evidence, especially pertaining to legislative acts that would normally be
privileged, could be helpful in obtaining prosecutions, even under
Justice Brennan’s formulation of the legislative privilege, it cannot be
termed as “blanket immunity.”124 Rather, the immunity only goes far
enough to prevent the legislative process from being compromised by
executive or judicial investigations.125 Thus, an expanded enforcement of the Speech or Debate Clause does not provide blanket immunity to legislators for their improprieties in the chambers of
Congress.126
Finally, Pingel contends that the balance of coequal branches of
government is disrupted by Rayburn House’s aggrandizement of the
legislature above the executive.127 However, a non-disclosure privilege is merely a remedy for a right that exists in the Speech or Debate
Clause already; namely, the right not to be questioned for legislative
acts. It does not provide Congress with any additional powers. To the
contrary, it respects the notion of coequal government branches by
making it more difficult for executive officials to delve deeply into
legislative records searching for evidence that a specific legislator may
have committed a crime. Such an investigation may be used as a pretense for the executive to peruse a congressman’s files containing
information about an upcoming vote, that legislator’s plans regarding
Congressional horse-trading, or other things outside the purview of
executive knowledge. Like other privileges, the legislative privilege
may suppress certain relevant evidence (especially when strengthened
by the non-disclosure privilege),128 but it comes with the benefit of
preserving our interest in an independent legislature and allowing
123 See id. at 452 (“Given [the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment,] there is no good reason to believe that the blanket suppression
in this case of evidence not covered by the Speech or Debate Clause would have any
deterrent effect and hence suppression of the unprivileged documents is unwarranted.” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984))).
124 See supra Part II B–C.
125 The final argument that Pingel made, that the legislative privilege is now more
powerful than the executive privilege, may be correct but it is beyond the scope of this
Note to discuss the executive privilege in depth. For the argument, see Pingel, supra
note 13, at 1645–47.
126 One wonders, perhaps, if proponents of this view would see qualified immunity
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) or sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, subject to state waiver, as “blanket immunity” because of their wide coverage.
127 Pingel, supra note 13, at 1645.
128 See supra note 21.
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Congress itself to ferret out instances of corruption within its ranks.129
Contrary to this assertion, the legislative privilege of non-disclosure
actually strengthens the functioning of the three coequal branches of
government.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RECENT ERROR
UNITED STATES V. RENZI 130

IN

A. Facts
As in Representative Jefferson’s case, former Representative Richard Renzi of Arizona was accused of “using his public office to benefit
himself rather than his constituents” by attempting to orchestrate a
land deal using his influence as a member of Congress.131 In 2005,
three years after he was elected to his post, Western Land Group
(Western) approached Representative Renzi, representing Resolution
Copper Mining LLC (RCC), about RCC possibly entering into a transaction with the federal government whereby RCC would obtain surface rights to extract copper from land that it owned near Phoenix.132
Renzi allegedly told Western and RCC to purchase another property
owned by James Sandlin (the Sandlin Property) in exchange for his
support. However, no deal could be reached between RCC/Western
and Sandlin.133 The Congressman’s alleged response to the breakdown of negotiations was to tell RCC/Western “[N]o Sandlin property, no bill.”134
With that having failed, Renzi allegedly made contact with Philip
Aries and began a similar type of negotiation. He told Aries that if the
property was purchased, he would make sure that the legislation
received a “free pass” through the House Natural Resources Committee.135 In neither set of negotiations did Renzi reveal that he was a
creditor of Sandlin.136 Aries’s group completed the sale with Sandlin,
who subsequently paid Renzi’s company $200,000. Renzi, however,
never introduced the promised bill.137 He was indicted on “[fortyeight] criminal counts related to his land exchange ‘negotiations,’
129
great
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

This is not an unrealistic expectation given that the two political parties have a
incentive to discredit each other in the media and other areas.
651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1016.
See id. at 1017.
Id.
Id. at 1030.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
See id. at 1017–18.
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including public corruption charges of extortion, mail fraud, wire
fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.”138 The appeal that the
Ninth Circuit decided was interlocutory in nature as Congressman
Renzi asserted that the Speech or Debate Clause barred the entire
prosecution as an investigation into his privileged legislative
activities.139
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Holding
The Ninth Circuit framed Renzi’s arguments on appeal as follows: (1) “that the district court erred by not dismissing the Government’s public corruption charges against him because, as he
contends, those charges are based on his ‘legislative acts’ or his motivation for his ‘legislative acts’ and would require the introduction of
‘legislative act’ evidence[;]” (2) “that the district court erred by not
dismissing the [indictment] in its entirety because, as he contends,
‘legislative act’ evidence permeated the Government’s presentation to
the grand jury[;]” and (3) “that the district court erred by refusing to
hold a Kastigar-like hearing to determine whether the Government
used evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause to obtain
non-privileged evidence and whether the government can prove its
case without allegedly tainted evidence.”140 Because the first two of
these issues were most likely resolved correctly given the Supreme
Court’s 1970s Speech or Debate cases, especially Brewster and
Gravel,141 this Note will not cover these and rather addresses the
Ninth Circuit’s erroneous holding that the legislative privilege does
not include a like privilege of evidentiary non-disclosure.142
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling erred in several ways. By stating that
the Supreme Court had never addressed the existence of such an evidentiary privilege, the Ninth Circuit proved little.143 The Supreme
Court has not had an extensive Speech or Debate Clause docket; in
fact, if it grants certiorari on this case or a similar one in the future, it
would be the first major Speech or Debate Clause case the highest
138 Id. at 1018.
139 Id. at 1016.
140 Id. at 1019 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)).
141 See supra Part II. But see text accompanying notes 66–70, 86–87 (discussing
Justice Brennan’s broader view of legislative acts and the prohibition established in
Johnson on investigation of the motive of individual legislators in making a specific
legislative act). However, these opinions are not the law.
142 The Ninth Circuit makes its split very visible: “Simply stated, we cannot agree
with our esteemed colleagues on the D.C. Circuit. We disagree with both Rayburn’s
premise and its effect and thus decline to adopt its rationale.” Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1034.
143 See id. at 1032–33.
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Court will hear in nearly thirty years. It has simply never had occasion
to determine whether the legislative privilege extends to written documents, or to privileged documents in the midst of some other,
unprivileged ones. However, combining the reasoning of Gravel144
and the D.C. Circuit cases Brown & Williamson and Rayburn House, it is
clear that such a privilege should exist and Representative Renzi
should have been granted a hearing to determine whether some of
the evidence obtained by the government was obtained using privileged materials.
This is a logical extension of the Clause. The testimonial or evidentiary privilege would mean little if the government could use the
privileged materials as a means to obtain non-privileged materials and
admit those non-privileged materials against the representative. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s exclamation, such a reading would not
“make Members of Congress supercitizens,”145 but simply confer on
them the privilege which they are guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Ninth Circuit also asserted that both Brown & Williamson and
Rayburn House erred by interpreting the Clause as a protection against
distraction of legislators and the legislative process.146 Whether Congressman Renzi or his office was distracted by the investigation or not,
the privilege protects against the use of a representative’s legislative
acts through testimony, so it should also prohibit the use of those acts
through written documents. Whatever the scope of legislative acts
(narrower today, of course, than in the days of Johnson), where the
privilege exists it is absolute.147 As a result, the Ninth Circuit erred by
refusing Congressman Renzi the opportunity to prove that some of
the admittedly non-privileged material the government obtained was
tainted because it would not have been discovered but for the use of
privileged materials.

144 See supra text accompanying notes 73–79 (showing that the Supreme Court in
Gravel assumed that, if the privilege applied, it would prevent the enforcement of
subpoenas against Senator Gravel and his aides—a clear testimonial privilege).
145 Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1016 (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516
(1972)).
146 See id. at 1034.
147 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975) (“The
question to be resolved is whether the actions of the petitioners fall within the ‘sphere
of legitimate legislative activity.’ If they do, the petitioners ‘shall not be questioned in
any other Place’ about those activities since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate
Clause are absolute.” (citations omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
Though the Speech or Debate Clause and the attached legislative
privilege are, compared to some other Constitutional law issues, less
popular both in terms of case law and legal scholarship, some very
important structural issues are at play in this circuit split. Should the
Supreme Court refuse to grant certiorari in this case, lower courts will
continue to struggle with the application of the doctrine. This is especially true given the wealth of different opinions on less controversial
issues such as the scope of the “legislative acts” requirement. As this
Note described, it was not until the early 1970s that the Supreme
Court began narrowing the privilege at all. Before then, given the
litigation record, it could have been said to be a near absolute bar
against civil and criminal actions in the sphere of somewhat legitimate
legislative activity. While it might never have been, and certainly can
no longer be described that way, it is still vitally important that the
framers’ notions of separation of powers, co-equal branches of government, and above all, the independence of the legislative process, be
recognized in our modern Constitutional interpretation.
Without the evidentiary privilege of non-disclosure expanded on
in Rayburn House, too often the Clause and the privilege will become
nugatory. While it may seem like bad policy to leave out reliable evidence of corruption in a house of Congress, the Constitution requires
that the executive and judiciary show restraint. The non-disclosure
privilege should have been applied in Renzi so as to prevent the government from obtaining non-privileged information through the use
of privileged documents. Because the law of the D.C. Circuit is so
vitally important on this issue (given the location of the federal government, it seems likely that many of these suits will be heard in
courts in the District), the Supreme Court should re-examine Rayburn
House and Renzi and conclude that in order to protect the framers’
notion of first principles and their belief that the legislature should
handle these issues without interference from the other branches, the
Supreme Court should recognize a broad evidentiary privilege of nondisclosure in its Speech or Debate Clause jurisprudence.

